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What We Did Last Summer Crisis
Remarks by Barney Frank*
Thank you. Thank you. I’ll talk for a while, but I want to leave
maximum time for conversation, because frankly I learn from the
questions and comments people make what the areas of interest are. And
when we get to that discussion period—excuse me—and I
appreciate . . . for some reason moderators instruct people in the
audiences that they are to ask a question, and not make a comment. I have
never understood why people like myself are supposed to be comment
phobic and have to be protected from people’s opinions. So if you want
to make a comment and want me to respond, that would be fine.
I’ll set out briefly with what we thought we were doing. I will give you
a little background. I got on the committee, and I later became chairman
because of my interest in affordable housing. It was then called the
committee on Banking, Financing, and Urban Affairs. In fact, at the time
I got on it, illogically, but for historical reasons, jurisdiction over the
banking industry was separate from jurisdiction over the securities
industry. And it wasn’t until 2003 that they were merged. And they were
merged, by the way, by the Republicans in control of the house—not
because of some final recognition of the inherent logic of dealing with
these two related subjects in one place, but because they had two equal
contestants for particular committee chairmanship, and the only way to
resolve it was involving this. I say that because before 2003 when I
became the senior Democrat on the committee and the committees’
jurisdiction merged I never paid much attention to the securities side. I
did have to learn it.
I say that because, if we get into it, the question is what were you doing
when the trouble was starting. I will claim to have been active in trying
to stop the proliferation of subprime mortgages because that was under
the jurisdiction of the committee I was on. I can’t claim any credit for
having been concerned about the problems with derivatives, nor any
blame. I just wasn’t involved. But as I became chairman and my attention
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got focused on the financial crisis and people ask when, well, starting
really in 2006 when Henry Paulson was named Secretary of Treasury
under Bush, and it became clear to people that the Democrats were going
to win the house in 2006 and I was going to be the chairman, and he began
telling me of his concerns and of their feelings, his and Ben Bernanke,
Chairman of Fed, that they did not have the tools to deal with this; so I
did began to look into it.
By 2008, early on, when the Bush administration had to make JP
Morgan Chase take over Bear Stearns, it was clear trouble was coming.
And as it went on I really developed a theory about what was happening
and what we were doing, and I think it was—the economic history of
America, and other capitalistic societies I assume, is pretty straight
forward. The private sector innovates. Government role is to have
regulations that try to promote the good things that the private sector does
and retard the bad things. Over time, the innovations in the private sector
outstrip the regulation. So, then the question is, can you update the
regulation? The stock market metastasizes in the twenties and all kinds
of things go on and it isn’t until the thirties that the regulation catches up.
But by the end of the New Deal, there was a pretty good system of
regulation of banks and securities firms done by the New Deal that lasted
pretty well until the eighties. And then beginning in 1980 two innovations
had the private financial system outstrip the regulation.
The first was that a lot of money started coming into our economy
available for loans from outside the banking system. The banking system
had been pretty tightly regulated, so if you were borrowing money from
a bank, there were pretty strict rules. And most of the borrowing that took
place, took place from banks. And if you borrowed from a bank, you were
borrowing from the entity which expected you, not expected you to,
which you had an obligation to repay. And since the bank’s income
depended on your repaying, they frisked you pretty good before they lent
you the money. If they lent money to people who aren’t going to repay
them, they got hurt.
Now a flood of money comes in from oil producing countries.
Remember OPEC starts around that time; from sovereign wealth funds;
from countries that have these enormous increases in their trade balances.
And as a result, beginning in the eighties, money is available for lending
outside the banking system. That erodes even the rules in the banking
system because the banks are now under competitive pressures. But the
second thing that had to happen to create the crisis was information
technology, because the distinctive factor of that economy was that the
loan business shifted.
Instead of making loans to people who were going to pay you back,
and you then worry about whether or not they had the capacity to pay you
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back, by the nineties loans were being made by institutions that promptly
packaged the loans and sold the right to be repaid in
securities—securitization. Well, if I am going to be repaid by the
borrowers, I am careful about the borrowers. If I get to sell the loan to
somebody else and get my money up front, and I don’t have to worry
about whether the borrowers repay, my incentive shifts from worrying
about the quality of each loan to the quantity of loans. And what happens
is that loans are made without regards to the ability to repay, and they are
then packaged into securities. And that leads to development of financial
derivatives. Derivatives have been around for a while. They were pork
bellies and oil. Derivatives were a way that people whose livelihood
depended on the price of a commodity could protect themselves against
wild price swings, but now that was being applied to financial
instruments, and given great leverage. So those two things transformed
the nature of the lending business.
By the nineties, you had this wonderful system for a lot of financial
institutions whereby they had found a way to make money by doing
things that were risky in principle, but not in a way that implicated them.
If you are a bank, and you can loan money to thousands of people, and
then securitize those loans, and sell the right to be repaid, you have
created a risk of nonrepayment, but you are not the bearer of the risk. That
risk is then dissipated out into the economy.
The theory was that people, the gate keepers of risk—it sounds just
ridiculous now to saying it, but people believed it at the time, the gate
keepers—the new gate keepers to keep bad risk out were going to be the
rating agencies. Michael Lewis’s The Big Short did a wonderful job there.
You had the rating agencies that would look at these packages of loans
and tell people whether or not there was a high likelihood of them being
repaid. It should be very clear that they were violating an important
principle that ought to govern commerce, and you’ll forgive the
directness, but it is the only way to get the point across: You should not
make shit up. But they did. They literally just made it up. They had no
idea—no idea. They didn’t do any research. They didn’t do any sampling.
They just guessed how much those packages would be worth.
Of course, they were rating the packages for the people who were
going to sell the packages who paid them for the rating. One of the things
we were not able to do: Anticipate the big question. That model is still
there for this reason. It’s impossible to come up with a buy-side rating
scheme. If you have ratings that are disseminated for the buyers, nobody
has the incentive to pay for that rating. If I am selling you a security, I
have an incentive to pay to have my security rated. But if I pay to have it
rated, you are going to have that conflict. The one good thing we were
able to do that I was proud of, was to simply repeal any rules at the federal
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level that required anybody to rely on the rating agencies before they
bought something. But it still hasn’t done as much. But anyway, that’s
where we were.
The financial system had outrun the regulations, so there were no
regulations about loans being made. There were no regulations under
derivatives. Specifically, with the derivatives, people were able to engage
in derivative transactions with no need to show that they could pay off:
You know, if you buy a stock you have to post some minimum amount.
If you are selling a derivative, you were able to sell that derivative. Credit
Default Swap, which is this wonderful name which they came up with,
and Credit Default Swap is insurance. Now we have a principle in
America with insurance that if you try to sell insurance, life, death,
casualty, fire, you have to show some regulator that you have the money
to pay off. But it turns out that if you call it a credit default swap, you’re
not subject to any state’s insurance rules, and you can insure the
mortgages people, the packages of mortgage people have bought, even if
you don’t have any money.
And so what happened was that. People who’d gotten mortgages and
could not pay them off, defaulted. As they defaulted the securities that
were based on their repayment string also defaulted. When they
defaulted, the holders of the securities went to the issuers of these credit
default credit swaps and said, “You got to pay up.” And the issuers of the
credit default swap said, “Who me?” They didn’t have any money. If you
think there is an exaggeration here, one of the biggest issuers, one of the
most important respected financial institutions in America, was the AIG
American International Group, and they were a major seller of credit
default swaps. They made a lot of money selling regular insurance; they
made so much money selling regular insurance they literally didn’t know
what to do with it. So, they started selling credit default swaps. They not
only sold many more credit default swaps than they could pay off when
the underlining securities began to fail, they had literally no idea how
much they owed. Again, I know it sounds like I am making stuff up
myself.
Two days after Lehman Brothers failed, AIG went into the Federal
Reserve and told Chairman Bernanke that they were $85 billion dollars
in debt beyond what they could pay for these failed securities. A week
later, in a meeting that he was having with Congressional leaders,
Bernanke was counting up—he and Paulson—how much money they
were going to need to pay, to stabilize things. And he said, “Oh, and
$85 billion for AIG.” We said, “You know, we are paying attention when
you told us that last week, the $85 billion for AIG.” He sounded a little
offended and said, “Oh, I apologize, that’s an additional $85 billion for
AIG.”
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AIG not only couldn’t pay off its credit default swaps—this great
respected financial institution—they had first thought they were
$85 billion in debt and they turned out ultimately $175 billion in debt.
They didn’t even get it quite right the second time. By the way, after the
federal government paid off that—and AIG ultimately paid it back, but it
kept them alive—the AIG founder, who was no longer running the
company, but he was the major shareholder, he sued the federal
government. He sued Bernanke and Paulson on the grounds that when the
federal government paid off the $170 billion in debt that he couldn’t
handle, the company was treated unfairly. My characterization of that, it
was the arsonist suing the fire department for water damage. The Court
of Claims, which are notoriously friendly to claimants, but they found
that technically he had an argument because they had not followed the
rules, and they awarded him $1.00 in damages.
But anyway, that’s where we come in. We have a situation in which
the business of lending has been transformed into one in which people
make loans, get paid by the quantity of the loans they make, and then
other people take those loans and package them and make money selling
them back and forth and insuring them. And the house of cards collapses
when at the root the loans can’t be paid off. My metaphor here is that the
loans were the bullets, the bad loans, and the derivatives were the guns
that spread them throughout the system. So that’s what we figured out,
that what we had to do was to come up with new rules to regulate these
things. So what we did was we acted on several levels.
First, most importantly, we outlawed the worst of the loans. We said
you just can’t make some of these loans period. We also, and here the
regulators didn’t do everything I wanted, we pushed for a requirement
that we call risk retention, some people call it skin in the game—namely,
that if you sell something, if you make a loan and then you sell it, you
have to retain some percentage of the loss: give you some incentive not
to do it. Now that remains in effect, a requirement for risk retention for
many packages, paradoxically, not for mortgage loans. But mortgage
loans are still restricted statutorily; there are categories you cannot offer.
Then we went to derivatives and basically passed the law that said you
can no longer engage in a derivative transaction without demonstrably
having the money to pay off, if a reasonably foreseen percentage don’t
pay. And we did that in several ways. The most important was to require
that derivatives be traded on exchanges the way stocks are. They had
argued that the derivatives were all one-off: They all had to be individual
because they were individually tailored. That turned out to be greatly
exaggerated. We did allow for that, but at an increasing percentage, most
derivatives are now traded on exchanges. And when it goes on an
exchange, the exchanges have to make sure both sides have the money.
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So, when you sell a stock on the exchange, you don’t have to worry that
the person who bought your stock is then going to say, “Oh, I’m sorry,
but I can’t pay for that.” They can no longer do that; the exchange makes
sure that the money is there. For derivatives sold off exchanges, there is
a requirement that they have margin: that they publish how much they are
going to do, and they show that they can pay it off.
Those two were aimed at reducing the extent to which financial
institutions would incur indebtedness. Remember, the problem was
financial institutions incurring indebtedness beyond what they could pay.
And that’s why, to anticipate, I never thought the problem was the size of
the financial institution. The problem is the size of the indebtedness that
the institution has that it cannot repay. What we did first of all, as I said,
was to make it less likely that you would have these unrepayable debts
by banning the bad mortgages and requiring that there be money behind
derivatives. The next level of defense was to say, look those are not
always going to work; there are still going to be some bad trades; there
are still going be some problems. So the next requirement was that any
institutions that engaged in this kind of financial activity had to have a
much bigger stock of capital to pay off. That’s one of the biggest things
that is done for banks and for others. If you are in the business of taking
financial risk, you are now required to have a much higher level of capital,
so that if a certain percentage of what you do fails, you are still there.
That’s the second level of defense.
The third level of defense is what’s called orderly liquidation. Paulson
and Bernanke, this one may be the most controversial—including some
of my friends on the left, who I think just get it wrong—Paulson and
Bernanke in 2008, when they had to deal with Bear Stearns, told us,
“Here’s the problem we have.” If a large financial institution can’t pay its
debts—and by the way, the fear of why we worry about a large institution
not paying it debts, not because we want to be nice to them, but because
things are interconnected. If a very large institution can’t pay its debts,
then its debtors cannot pay their debts, and the debtors’ debtors can’t pay
their debts, and it spirals downward: there is a contagion. So what you try
to do is pay some of the debts so it does not go beyond that.
What Paulson and Bernanke told us in 2008 was that they had two
choices if a large financial institution couldn’t pay its debts: Lehman and
AIG were within two days of each other, were the example. When
Lehman came to them and said, “We can’t pay our debts,” they say,
there’s controversy about, we can get into it, Paulson and Bernanke said,
“Well, that’s too bad, we can’t do anything about it.” Their view was that
the federal government could intervene as it did with Bear Sterns or as it
did with AIG only if the entity seeking help was temporarily unable to
pay its debts but could be seen as regaining its solvency if it got help.
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They couldn’t give to people who had no chance of recovery; they
believed that Lehman had no chance of recovery.
They tried to get the British bank, Barclays, to buy Lehman, and the
British authorities said you have to contribute some, and they said, “No
we can’t, we couldn’t give any federal money.” And the British said, “Let
me see if we understand this: you have this failing American institution,
and you would like the British government to bail it out; we don’t think
so.” And Paulson had to say, “Ya, I guess you have a point.” So Lehman
failed. The failure of Lehman traumatizes people. It turns out when
Lehman fails, that everybody gets worried.
Nobody is going to lend money to anybody else, because this whole
system of being able to count on the money isn’t there. There were some
people, particularly Republicans, who welcomed Lehman failing. These
were people who were very critical when Bear Stearns was saved,
because the debtors of Bear Stearns were saved, Bear Sterns as an entity
disappeared and became part of JP Morgan Chase. And there was some
celebration, some conservative Republicans said, “Wonderful, now we
have free enterprise, we let them fail.” By Tuesday, they failed on Sunday
morning, or Sunday night, by Tuesday the consequences on that failure
were traumatizing people. The economies everywhere were shutting
down.
By the way, people have talked about the crash of 2008 being worse,
almost as bad as the Great Depression. In some ways it was worse
because, during the Great Depression, you still had geographic
granularity. Something could be terrible in one part of the world and not
so bad elsewhere. By 2008 the entire financial world was on one grid. So
when there was a problem anywhere, there was a problem everywhere.
And so, as a result of that Paulson and Bernanke decided, and with a lot
of support, “We can’t let another institution of this size simply go out of
business.”
I was interested myself to note that a number of the conservative
purists who had celebrated the advent of free enterprise with the collapse
of Lehman became a little less enamored with pure free enterprise. In
fact, I announced that I was filing a bill to make September fifteenth, the
day Lehman failed, Free Enterprise Day to commemorate the one day in
American history when we had had free enterprise. But by Wednesday,
when AIG came in and Paulson and Bernanke said, “Ok we are going to
pay your debts,” here was the problem: They had been telling us all year
that they had two choices, they could either pay none of the debts
(Lehaman), or all of the debts (AIG), and neither one was satisfactory.
And what they wanted was an ability for the Federal Government to
step in. In that case, pay, put the institution out of business, but in an
orderly fashion—that’s why it is called the Orderly Liquidation
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Authority—and to have them pay some of the debts, but not all. Under
existing law, you had to pay everybody or nobody; we gave them the
authority to pay some of the debts, not all. And, it is important, there is a
mandate that, if the Federal Government has to step in in a situation like
that and put up some money to pay some of the debts after the entity has
completely liquidated, the Secretary of Treasury then has to recover any
amount paid out for those debts from financial institutions worth $50
billion or more. And that’s a mandate.
Now you will have some people say, “Oh, we haven’t solved the
problem.” So, that’s, that’s the answer regarding too big to fail. First of
all, we make it much less likely that institutions will fail by not letting
them engage in risky transactions. And at the second level of defense,
requiring them to have more money in case they do engage in risky
transactions and have to pay up. But the third level is, if both of those fail,
they’ve taken too many risks and have too little money despite our best
efforts to pay it off, they fail; they are put out of business. They are too
big to fail without some intervention, but they fail and the Federal
Government steps in and pays only some of their debts.
What you have are some critics of our third approach. They’re saying,
“Oh, it will never work because if a very large financial institution can’t
pay its debts and it is threatened with being put out of business, there will
be enormous political pressure on the president to step in and save it.”
And, I do not know where those people have been living, but it cannot
have been in America for the past ten years. Because if a large financial
institution these days—and still, for the anger has not gone away—were
to be in serious financial difficulty, and come to the federal government
and say, “We now have much more debt than we can pay off, you got to
help us,” there would be overwhelming public demand that we shoot
them. The notion that they would be candidates for bailouts is ridiculous.
At any rate, that’s what we did.
We think, I was saying to Doug the other day, that’s been working
pretty well. One indication of that, Wall Street Journal first page this
morning, Goldman Sachs Has Transformed Its Business Model. Goldman
Sachs is doing much less trading—much less of the razzle dazzle, wheeler
dealer stuff—and much more conventional banking—doing investment
banking. They are helping companies raise money. They are lending.
There has been a significant move in the financial industry towards less
glamourous and more stable activity.
We had our friends on the left who said, “Oh, you didn’t do enough,”
and they were hypercritical of everything we did. Amongst the things we
did, of course, was the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Elizabeth
Warren’s idea. But many of the people on the left said, “No you didn’t
do enough, that’s not going to work.” They continued to argue that what
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we did wasn’t worth anything until Donald Trump got elected and
announced that he was going to dismantle it—after which it suddenly
became much too important to let him dismantle. They’re in fact right.
The law has worked substantially as we wanted it to. There are very few
derivatives these days of the kind AIG engaged in where the
counterparties, as they are called, don’t have enough money between
them. Derivatives these days are much more carefully monitored, and
they are exchanged under derivatives. The bad loans are not being made
anymore.
Now, a bill did go through to modify this. I thought it made one
mistake: It raised the level at which a bank gets extra supervision from
the federal regulators from $50 billion in assets to $250. I thought $125
was appropriate. I thought for some years that that should have been it,
and I regret that. But, that is a fairly small change. The main thing the bill
did that was signed into law was to take away the grievances of the
smallest banks under $10 billion. They did not really contribute that much
to the crisis, but they are the ones with the political clout. Frankly, Bank
of America and JP Morgan Chase don’t have a lot of political influence.
They only have a presence in a few districts, and nobody likes them. One
of the districts is mine. The CEO of Bank of America was my constituent,
but he understood we were going to do what we did. The smaller banks,
on the other hand, they are in everybody’s district. The community bank
is at the Rotary, and they are everywhere. So they are the ones with
political clout. So what Congress did was to buy off the only element in
the political atmosphere that had the clout to force changes in the bill. So,
the bill will now stay exactly as it is indefinitely, and it is very much in
effect.
On the other hand, we have Trump and a few of the other right wingers
arguing that we had so over regulated the financial system that we had
greatly hindered its ability to perform its function. Remember, the
function of the financial system is technically intermediation. The notion
is that the financial system scoops up money from people who have
surplus money and nothing particularly productive to do with it, but are
looking for a return on that money. So they make it available through the
financial industry to the productive elements in society so that people
who make things and employ people, they, the banks are the
intermediaries between other individuals with extra cash and the
productive sector. And the argument is that we basically hindered the
ability of the financial institutions to do this. And if the productive sector
of the economy is prevented from getting the money that people are
looking to make available, then the economy is obviously going to suffer.
The problem for President Trump is that he makes that argument while
simultaneously noting that we have an economy that God wishes he could
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have. It really is not logically possible to insist that we have the best
economy in the history of the world, humming along at full productive
weight, but that somehow the liberals crippled the mechanism by which
it functions. The fact is, what we did has had very little negative effect on
the economy, has increased stability. And that’s why de facto we are at a
situation now where this is going to go forward.
The final I’d say is, while Trump says one thing, his actions haven’t
always correlated. Many of Trump’s appointees to the important
positions in fact have implicitly, and in some cases, explicitly, accepted
it. Jay Powell, the new Chairman of the Federal Reserve, is fully in accord
with the legislation and in using those powers. In fact, where the Congress
lowered the level down to $250 where you do extra supervision, Powell
has said that he will use the powers the Fed still has to supervise people
below that anyway. So, it’s not automatic, but he can do it as a matter of
discretion. The head of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission—which is the major entity for regulating
derivatives—Christopher Giancarlo, says he likes the bill and he is
enforcing it.
So, summary and I will throw this open. We believe what we did was
to correct the problem of innovations outstripping regulations which
allowed financial institutions to load risk into the economy as a whole
and profit from doing that without themselves being exposed to the risk
so that they had an incentive to do that. We, I think, have corrected that.
We have reconnected the ability to incur risk for the economy with the
liability for that risk to the institution involved in a way that it has not in
any shape or form slowed down the economy.
Last point as part of that: We did make some effective changes in the
compensation system. It is true that the CEOs of these entities and others
still make very large sums of money, but that was less the issue than the
way the incentive system worked. The way the incentive system worked,
they had a bonus system which essentially was head you win, tails you
break even. People could take risks: If the risk paid off, they got money;
but if the risk failed, they didn’t lose anything. So, we have done two
things in the bill. One, we have given the shareholders the right to vote
every few years, on whether they like the share of the CEO’s pay or not,
and a couple have voted it down. But more importantly, there was a
requirement that any bonus, any incentive system be two-way. That to
the extent that people make money if something they do goes up, then
they lose money if it goes down, called clawbacks. And that, we believe,
has also had an effect on tamping down the taking of risk. But the main
thing to do was to institutionally reconnect the legal authority to incur
risk with the liability for paying off the risk if it didn’t work out as you
thought; and we think it has worked out well.

